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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This appeal is from the final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Hon. John Paul Kennedy, District Court Judge 
presiding. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j), since 
the appeal was transfer by the Utah Supreme Court as allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(4). 
The relevant dates of the appeal are: 
(a.) the final judgment appealed from was entered August 12, 2005; 
(b.) the notice of appeal was filed September 11, 2005; and 
(c.) there were no motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue I: THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE JURY TO DETERMINE THE LAW OF A CITIZEN'S ARREST. 
Standard of review: State v. Trane, 2002 Utah LEXIS 138,*; 2002 UT 97; 57 P.3d 1052, 
[*12] "The actual issue in this case is whether the [NPS] officers had authority and 
probable cause to arrest [plaintiff]." 
II. Issue: THE COURT'S JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO DETERMINE 
THE FACTS OF A CITIZEN'S ARREST WERE IN ERROR. 
The jury was given the following questions for its determination: 
3. Defendant, or its employees or agents, had the lawful right to detain the 
Plaintiff because: 
a. The Defendant, and or its employee or agent, had reason to 
believe that merchandise had been wrongfully taken by the Plaintiff, 
and the merchandise can (sic) be recovered by detaining the Plaintiff 
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in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time, for the 
purpose of attempting to effect the recovery of the merchandise or 
for the purpose of informing a peace officer of the circumstances of 
the detention. 
Yes X [jury answer] 
No 
b. The Defendant, and or its employee or agent, had probable 
cause to believe that Plaintiff had committed a retail theft or had 
taken the goods with an intent to steal them, if the detention is for a 
reasonable length of time for all or any of the following purposes: to 
recover the goods, or to make reasonable inquiry as to whether 
Plaintiff has in his possession unpurchased merchandise; to request 
and/or verify identification. 
Yes X [jury answer] 
No 
c. to inform a peace officer of the detention of the person and 
surrender that person to the custody of a peace officer. 
Yes 
No _X [jury answer] 
Standard of review: Eddy v. Albertson's, Inc., 2001 Utah LEXIS 172,*; 2001 UT 88; 34 
P.3d 781, " . . . . [*5] A. Sufficiency of the Evidence. A judgment should be vacated only 
if, after viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 
the prevailing party, the appellate court concludes that the evidence is insufficient to 
sustain the verdict. Franklin v. Stevenson, 1999 UT 61, 987 P.2d 22." 
III. Issue: THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED APPELLANT 
TO PAY THE APPELLEE'S COURT COSTS. 
It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff take 
nothing, that the action be dismissed on the merits, and that 
Defendant recover court costs from Plaintiff in the amount of 
$687.00. 
-2-
Standard of review: Eddy v. Albertson's, Inc., 2001 Utah LEXIS 172,*; 2001 UT 88; 34 
P.3d 781, "[*9] The jury was justified in concluding that the [NPS] employees 
detained [appellant] on suspicion of shoplifting and that they failed to satisfy the citizen's 
arrest statutory requirements. While there was other evidence supportive of [appellee's] 
version of events, the jury was entitled to make its own judgments on controverted 
testimony regarding the facts." 
IV. Issue: THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE 
APPELLANT DAMAGES AWARDED TO HIM BY THE JURY. 
The jury was instructed: 
If you find that Plaintiff was detained, please state the dollar 
amount of damage, if any, Plaintiff proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he suffered as a direct and 
proximate consequence of the detention. $5,000.00 [jury 
answer] 
Standard of review: Eddy v. Albertson's, Inc., 2001 Utah LEXIS 172,*; 2001 UT 88; 34 
P.3d 781,: "[*5] Sufficiency of the Evidence court concludes that the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain the verdict. Franklin v. Stevenson, 1999 UT 61, 987 P.2d 22." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a citizen's arrest by the defendant-appellee, National Products 
Sales d.b.a., ("NPS"), when they placed the plaintiff-appellant Lynn A. Jenkins I., under 
an arrest by handcuffing him and physically placing him into a small confinement room 
at its sales location on Armstrong Drive in Salt Lake City Utah. The appellee's claimed 
immunity under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-602, 76-6-603, 76-6-604, 77-7-3, 77-7-12, 77-
-3-
7-14 and 78-11-18. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The United States Supreme Court in its recent slip opinion, DOLAN v. UNITED 
STATES POSTAL SERVICE ET AL., Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, No. 04-848. Argued November 7, 2005, Decided February 22, 2006 
raised to the issue of the congressional grant of governmental employee immunity and 
clearly ruled that federal employees were not immune from tort claims since congress 
mandated a reasonable delivery of the US mail and DOLAN was denied that reasonable 
mail delivery which caused her harm. 544 U. S. (2005) page 4., Section II: 
We assume that under the applicable state law a person injured by 
tripping over a package or bundle of papers negligently left on the porch of 
a residence by a private party would have a cause of action for damages. 
See 28 U. S. C. §§1346(b)(l), 2674. The question is whether, when mail 
left by the Postal Service causes the slip and fall, the §2680(b) exception 
for "loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter" 
preserves sovereign immunity despite the FTCA's more general statements 
of waiver page 5 . . . 'transmission5 in §2680(b) follow two other 
terms, Toss' and 'miscarriage.' Those terms, we think, limit the reach of 
'transmission.5 '[A] word is known by the company it keeps5— a rule that 
'is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order 
to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.5 Jarecki 
v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961); see also Dole v. 
Steelworkers, 494 U. S. 26, 36 (1990) ('[W]ords grouped in a list should be 
given related meaning5 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
A citizen's arrest is criminal in nature which clearly denies the arrested party any 
due process, or the rights afforded the criminal at large, in other words, qualified 
immunity means a person placed under a citizen's arrest is guilty of shoplifting, without a 
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trial, nor protection by a magistrate nor right to face his accuser. The United States 
Supreme Court determined that a federal agent's " . . . [q]ualified immunity is not the law 
to simply save trouble" WILL ETAL. v. HALLOCKETAL., Certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, No. 04-1332. Argued November 28, 
2005, Decided January 18, 2006, slip page 7., 546 U.S. (2006): 
. . . . Qualified immunity is not the law simply to save trouble for the 
Government and its employees; it is recognized because the burden of trial 
is unjustified in the face of a colorable claim that the law on point was not 
clear when the official took action, and the action was reasonable in light 
of the law as it was. The nub of qualified immunity is the need to induce 
officials to show reasonable initiative when the relevant [shoplifting] 
law is not "clearly established," Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 
(1982); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202 (2001); a quick 
resolution of a qualified immunity claim is essential. (Emphases added) 
page 8 . , . . . . the moment an official is served with a complaint, the 
judgment bar can be raised only after a case under the [federal] Tort Claims 
Act has been resolved in the Government's favor. If a Bivens action alone 
is brought, there will be no possibility of a judgment bar, nor will there be 
so long as a Bivens action against officials and a [federal] Tort Claims Act 
against the Government are pending simultaneously . . . . 
ARGUMENT 
As to Issue: I., the court clearly erred when it gave instructions to the jury to 
determine the law of a citizen's arrest. Determinative law: The Supreme Court has stated 
an arrest is an issue of law. See: State v. Trane, 2002 Utah LEXIS 138,*; 2002 UT 97; 57 
P.3d 1052, "Further, the questions of whether an arrest.. . is constitutional are questions 
of law . . . . State v Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199; State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 
(Utah 1992)." 
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As to Issue: IL, the court's jury instructions to determine the facts of the citizen's 
arrest were in error. Determinative law: Eddy v. Albertson's, Inc., 2001 UT 88; 34 P.3d 
781: " [ * 6 ] . . . . The 'citizen's arrest' statute provides, in pertinent part, that '[a] private 
person may arrest another: (1) For a public offense committed by another in his presence 
' Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-3(1) [*7] (1995) (emphasis omitted). However, for such 
an arrest to be lawful, section 77-7-6(1) of the Utah Code requires that 'the person 
making the arrest shall inform the person being arrested of his intention, cause and 
authority to arrest him.' [*8] In McFarlandv. Skaggs, 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), 
we explained that the notice of 'intention, cause and authority' of section 77-7-6 of the 
Utah Code must be given 'at the time the prisoner is detained or the arrest is effected, 
rather than sometime later during the time of detention,' otherwise, the arrest falls 'short 
of the statutory mandate' and the defendant 'fails to perfect whatever privilege it might 
have . . . to arrest plaintiff for the offense. Id. at 302." 
As to Issue: III., the court erred when it ordered appellant to pay the appellee's 
court costs. Determinative law: Eddy v. Albertson's, Inc., 2001 Utah LEXIS 172,*; 2001 
UT 88; 34 P.3d 781, "[*4] . . . . The jury found that [NPS had] falsely imprisoned [*5] 
[appellant], but did not find intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the 
jury awarded $ 5616 in damages and costs." 
As to Issue: IV., the court erred when it denied the appellant damages awarded to 
him by the jury. Determinative law: Eddy v. Albertson's, Inc., 2001 UT 88; 34 P.3d 781. 
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"[*6] Based on th[e] evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the 
two [appellee's] employees were acting on suspicion of shoplifting, and that under the 
circumstances the suspicion was unfounded and could not give rise to a right to arrest 
and detain." 
The jury's verdict on August 12, 2005 found: 
1. Plaintiff was detained by Defendant or its employees or agents who 
acted intentionally and without Plaintiffs consent. 
Yes _X [jury answer] 
No 
2. Plaintiff was aware of the detention or was damaged by the detention. 
Yes _X [jury answer] 
No 
The appellee's immunity, granted by the jury, failed to meet the immunity 
standard established by the Utah Supreme Court in Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79; 
57 P.3d 1007; 453 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, citing Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 1X1 P.2d 
670 (Utah 1985): 
The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1279 
(1995); Industrial Comm'n v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825, 831 (1918) (The 
question of ultimate legal liability cannot be withdrawn from the courts.5). 
Second, open courts or remedies clauses were intended to grant individuals rights 
to a judicial remedy for the protection of their person, property, or reputation from 
abrogation and unreasonable limitation by economic interests that could control 
state legislatures. See Schuman, 65 Temp. L. Rev. at 1208; Berry, 111 P.2d at 
675.1 
1
 Also note: RUSSON, Justice, concurring: . , . The Berry test applies to 
legislative acts that would restrict or eliminate the right of the people to seek a remedy 
under the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution against a person, business, or 
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together with, the equal protection requirements stated in Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 Utah 
LEXIS 117,*; 2002 UT 89; 54 P.3d 1069; 455 Utah Adv. Rep. 3: 
f31 Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution states: 'All laws of a 
general nature shall have uniform operation.5 Utah Const, art. I, § 24. The 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a state 
from enacting laws that deny 'any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.' U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Despite their 
dissimilar language, these two constitutional provisions 'embody the same 
general principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and 
persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their 
circumstances were the same.5 Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 
1984); see also Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 355-56 
(Utah 1997) (observing that Utah's uniform operation of laws provision 
and federal Equal Protection Clause 'embody the same general principles5); 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 888 
(Utah 1988) (same); Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80, 81 n.l (Utah 1982) 
(stating that article I, section 24 is 'generally considered the equivalent of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution5). 
CONCLUSION 
The appellee-defendant NPS has acted in bad faith concerning the citizen's arrest 
and should be required to pay appellant's prayer for relief, as stated in the complaint 
matter. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court enter its judgment as follows: 
1. For an Order that Defendant, and its employees are jointly and severally liable 
to Plaintiff in the amount of not less than $250,000.00, or such other and further amounts 
as may be proven at trial. 
government entity participating in a private or proprietary action that allegedly harmed 
them. 
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2. For an Order that Defendant, and its officers and directors are jointly and 
severally liable to Plaintiff in the amount of not less than $250,000,00. or such other and 
further amounts as may be proven at trial 
3. For an Order that Defendant, and the owners of the premises used and occupied 
by Defendant be jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff in the amount of not less than 
$250,000.00; or such other and further amounts as may be proven at trial 
4. For costs and attorneys fees, as may be just and reasonable. 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
DATED this^jt day of April 2006. 
LYNN ArJENKINS L, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, pro se. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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LYNN A. JENKINS I., 
3 East 2750 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 299-1513 
Plaintiff, pro se, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN A. JENKINS, I. ) 
) EXPEDITED MOTION TO STAY 
Plaintiff, ) JURY TRIAL 
vs. ) Civil No.010911737 
NATIONAL PRODUCT SALES, ) Judge John Paul Kennedy 
INC. d.b.a. NPS, and JOHN DOES ) 
I-X ) 
Defendants. ) 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff Lynn A. Jenkins, pro se., and petitions the 
Court for a stay of the jury trial scheduled on Friday, August 12, 2005 at 8:30 
a.m., in the above entitled matter so that he can petition the Court to rule on 
the claim of immunity as raised by defendant's National Product Sales, Inc., 
d.b.a., NPS, in its "PROPOSED JURY VERDICT FORM" and "PROPOSED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS" for the jury trial. 
It is alleged, the Defendant's claim of immunity appears to be unlawful 
and/or unconstitutional as to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (2004)("Criminal 
ADDENDUM 
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Trespass"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (2004)("Retail Theft Statute"); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-603 (2004)("Retail Theft Statute"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
604 (2004)("Retail Theft Statute"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-3 (2004)("Citizen's 
Arrest"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-12 (2004)("Detention Statute"); Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-14 (2004)fDetention Statute"); and Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-18 
(2004)("Shoplifting Statute") in relationship to the following Utah's 
constitutional mandates: 
Article I, Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; 
to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for 
redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and 
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
Article I, Section 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law. 
Article I, Section 11. [Courts open ~ Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
2 ADDENDUM 
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Article I, Section 12, [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal 
in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude 
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine 
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as 
defined by statute or rule. 
Article I, Section 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or parole, 
or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous felony charge, 
when there is substantial evidence to support the new felony 
charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated by 
statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is substantial 
evidence to support the charge and the court finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that the person would constitute a 
substantial danger to any other person or to the community or is 
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likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 
Article I, Sec t ion 13. [Prosecution by information or 
indictment - Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, 
shall be prosecuted by information after examination and 
commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived 
by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, 
with or without such examination and commitment. The 
formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof 
shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 
Article I, Sect ion 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden -
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
Article I, Sect ion 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Artic le I, Sect ion 26- [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be 
otherwise. 
Article I, Sect ion 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to 
the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government. 
The defendant's immunity fails to meet the private immunity s tandard 
ADDENDUM 
Page 4 
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Laney v. Fairview City. 2002 UT 
79; 57 P.3d 1007; 453 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, citing Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp,. 
717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985): 
The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 Or. L. 
Rev. 1279 (1995); Industrial Comm'n v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825, 
831 (1918) ("The question of ultimate legal liability cannot be 
withdrawn from the courts."). Second, open courts or remedies clauses 
were intended to grant individuals rights to a judicial remedy for the 
protection of their person, property, or reputation from abrogation and 
unreasonable limitation by economic interests that could control state 
legislatures. See Schuman, 65 Temp. L. Rev. at 1208; Berry, 717 P.2d at 
675. [Note: RUSSON, Justice, concurring: . . . The Berry test applies to 
legislative acts that would restrict or eliminate the right of the people 
to seek a remedy under the open courts provision of the Utah 
Constitution against a person, business, or government entity 
participating in a private or proprietary action that allegedly harmed 
them.] 
together with, the equal protection requirement stated in 2002 UT 89; 54 P.3d 
1069; 455 Utah Adv. Rep. 3; 2002 Utah LEXIS 117,*; Gallivan v. Walker.: 
1131 Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution states: "All 
laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.1' Utah 
Const, art, I, § 24. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution prohibits a state from enacting laws that 
deny "any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.11 U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Despite their dissimilar 
language, these two constitutional provisions "embody the same 
general principle: persons similarly situated should be treated 
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be 
treated as if their circumstances were the same.'1 Malan v. Lewis, 
693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984); see also Carrier u. Pro-Tech 
Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 355-56 (Utah 1997) (observing that 
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Utah's uniform operation of laws provision and federal Equal 
Protection Clause "embody the same general principles"); 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 
888 (Utah 1988) (same); Liedtke v. Schetthr, 649 P.2d 80, 81 n.l 
(Utah 1982) (stating that article I, section 24 is "generally 
considered the equivalent of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution"). 
WHEREFORE the plaintiff alleges there is a need for a stay of the 
scheduled jury trial so that the parties herein might file their memorandums 
as to the claimed immunity of the defendant in the above entitled action, also, 
the constitutionality of the above Utah Code citations and for such other and 
further relief the Court deems proper in the premises on file herein. 
DATED t h i s / y day of August, 2005. 
JENKINS L, 
Plaintiff^p^o se, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that oi/^L^Hay of August 2005, a true and correct copy 
of the above EXPEDITED MOTION FOR STAY OF JURY TRIAL was 
placed in the U.S. Mail, postage first class prepaid, x hand delivered, 
facsimile, to the following: 
Terry M. Plant Esq., 
Andrew M. Wadsworth Esq., 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
130 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
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Members of the Jury: Attached are instructions numbered 1 through 33. 
Taken together, these instructions govern your conduct and deliberations during the trial 
of this case and must be carefully considered and followed. 






1. GENERAL INSTRUCTION 
There are certain laws and rules which apply to this case. I'll 
explain them to you from time to time during these proceedings in 
order to give you the information that you need to fulfill your role as 
jurors at each stage of the trial. I will give you the first set of 
instructions at this point. You will receive further instructions 
before evidence is presented and the final set of instructions after 
the close of evidence. Please pay careful attention. Each of you has 
been given a copy of these instructions. This copy is yours to keep. 
As I read these instructions to you, you may follow along on your 
copy, or not, as you wish. Keep in mind the following points: 
Obey Instructions. Some of these instructions give you 
information about how the trial will proceed, the rules that 
govern this process, and the roles of the participants, including 
your role as jurors. Other instructions tell you what the law is 
that you are to apply in reaching your verdict in this case. If 
any attorney makes statements of the law that differ from the 
instructions on the law that I give to you, you should disregard 
such statements and rely entirely on these instructions. 
Many Instructions. There will be many instructions. All are 
important. Don't pick out one and ignore the rest. Think about 
each instruction in the context of all the others. 
Gender -Singular/Plural. In these instructions, any 
references to "she" or "her" also include "he" or "him," or vice 
versa, as appropriate to this case; and the singular, such as 
"Defendant" includes the plural "Defendants," when 
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appropriate. 
Note Taking. The Bailiff has provided you with notepads and 
pens. You may take notes during the trial, but don't over do it, 
and don't let it distract you from following the evidence. The 
lawyers will review the evidence in their closing arguments 
and help you focus on what is most relevant to your decision. 
I also caution that notes are not evidence. Use them only to 
aid personal memory or concentration. Keep in mind that you 
must each arrive at a verdict independently, and one juror's 
memory of the evidence or opinion should not be given 
excessive consideration solely because that juror has taken 
notes. 
Keep an Open Mind. Don't form or express an opinion about 
the ultimate issues in this case until you have listened to all the 
evidence and the lawyers' summaries, along with the final 
instructions on the law. Keep an open mind until your 
deliberations are completed. 
2. WHAT RULES APPLY TO RECESSES 
From time to time I will call for a recess. It may be for a few 
minutes, a lunch break, overnight or longer. During recesses, do not 
talk about this case with anyone; not family, friends or even with 
each other. The bailiff may ask you to wear a badge identifying 
yourself as a juror so that people will not try to discuss the case with 
you. Don't mingle with the lawyers, the parties, the witnesses or 
anyone else connected with the case. You may say "hello" or 
exchange similar brief civilities with these persons, in passing, but 
don't engage in any conversation. Don't accept from or give to any 
of these persons any favors, however slight, such as rides or food. 
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The lawyers and parties are naturally concerned to avoid any 
hint of improper contact with you, so don't think that they are being 
purposely rude if they avoid any interaction with you during the 
course of this trial. If anyone tries to talk to you about the case, let 
the bailiff know immediately. You may communicate with the 
bailiff or among yourselves about topics other than a subject of the 
trial. Don't read about this case in the newspaper or listen to any 
reports on television or radio, if there are any. Finally, don't form 
or express an opinion regarding any subject of the trial until you are 
sent out for deliberation at the end of the trial. These restraints are 
necessary for a fair trial. 
3. THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE, THE JURY AND THE 
LAWYERS and PARTIES ACTING PRO SE 
The judge, the jury and the lawyers are all officers of the Court 
and play important roles in the trial. 
Judge. It is my role as judge to decide all legal issues, 
supervise the trial and instruct the jury on the LAW that it 
must apply. 
Jury. It is your role as the jury to follow that law and decide 
the factual issues. Factual issues generally relate to WHO, 
)VHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW or similar things concerning 
which evidence will be presented. 
Lawyers and parties acting pro se. It is the role of the 
lawyers and parties acting on their own behalf without the help 
of a lawyer to present evidence, generally by calling and 
questioning witnesses and presenting exhibits. It is the 
responsibility of each side to be an advocate, and each has a 
duty to try to persuade you to accept their version of the facts 
and to decide the case in favor of their position. 
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The ethical rules and the standards of professionalism 
adopted in this state are very important to this proceeding. 
Those rules and standards require that lawyers demonstrate 
courtesy, candor, and cooperation. Consistent with their 
duties, each side must diligently advance their legitimate 
interests. They should do so with energy and courage. At the 
same time, each side should not engage in conduct that is 
uncivil, abrasive, abusive, hostile, or obstructive. Instead, each 
side should treat others in a courteous and dignified manner. 
We all have the right to expect civil and professional conduct 
from all participants involved in this case. 
Keep in mind that neither the lawyers, the parties, nor I 
actually decide the facts of this case, because that is your role. 
Don't be influenced by what you think our personal opinions 
are; rather, you decide the case based upon the law explained 
in these instructions and the evidence presented in court. 
4. OUTLINE OF THE TRIAL 
The trial will generally proceed as follows: 
Opening Statements. Each side will outline what the case is 
all about, and they will indicate what they think the evidence 
will show. 
Presentation of Evidence. The Plaintiff will offer its evidence 
first, followed by the Defendant. Each side may also offer 
rebuttal evidence after hearing the witnesses and seeing the 
exhibits offered by the other side. If an exhibit is given to you 
to examine, you should examine it carefully, individually, and 
without any comment. 
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Recesses and Breaks. During the trial there will be periods of 
time when the court recesses. During those times you must not 
discuss the case with anyone, including fellow jurors; you 
should not allow anyone to discuss the case with you. If any 
attempt is made to do so, you should report that to the bailiff 
immediately. You should not read, hear, or see media 
coverage of this trial. 
Additional instructions on the Law. After each side has 
presented its evidence, I will give you additional instructions 
on the law that applies to this case. 
Closing Arguments. Each side will then summarize and argue 
the case. They will share with you their respective views of 
the evidence, how it relates to the law and how they think you 
should decide the case. 
Jury Deliberation. The final step is for you to retire to the 
jury room and deliberate until you reach a verdict, and you 
will be given additional instructions about how you are to do 
that later. During your deliberations, we will not be able to 
provide you with transcripts of the trial testimony; you will 
have to rely on your memory. Thus it is important, whether 
you take notes or not, that you observe the witnesses carefully 
and listen carefully to the testimony. 
5. THE CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES. 
The Plaintiff asserts that he was wrongfully detained at 
Defendant's store and as a result of the wrongful actions of 
Defendant or Defendant's employees or agents, he suffered 
damages in the amount of $250,000. The Defendant denies any 
wrongful actions on its behalf or behalf of any of its employees or 
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agents. 
6. WHAT IS THE JURY'S ROLE IN THIS CASE? 
You must decide whether the Plaintiffs claim has been 
established under the standard set for the Plaintiffs burden of proof 
or not. Your decision is called a VERDICT. Your verdict must be 
based only on the evidence produced here in court. It must be based 
on facts, not on speculation. Don't guess about any fact. However, 
you may draw reasonable inferences or arrive at reasonable 
conclusions from the evidence presented. You should perform your 
duty to be a jury uninfluenced by passion or prejudice against the 
Defendant. You must not allow yourselves to be biased against the 
Defendant simply because the Plaintiff has brought this case in court 
You are to be governed in your deliberations solely by the 
evidence introduced in this trial and the law as stated to you by me. 
The law forbids you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, 
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Both 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant have a right to demand and they do 
demand and expect that you will conscientiously and 
dispassionately consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law 
of the case, that you will reach a just verdict regardless of what the 
consequences of such verdict may be. The verdict must represent 
the individual opinion of each juror. Three-fourths of the members 
of the jury must agree upon the verdict. 
7. WHAT IS EVIDENCE? 
Evidence is anything that tends to prove or disprove the 
existence of a disputed fact. Evidence includes testimony, 
documents, objects, photographs, recordings, stipulations, certain 
qualified opinions, and/or any combination of these things. 
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Sometimes the lawyers may agree that certain facts exist; this is 
called a stipulation. You should accept any stipulated facts as 
having been proved. In limited instances, I may take "judicial 
notice" of a well-known fact. If that happens, I will explain how 
you should treat it. 
8. OPINION TESTIMONY 
Under certain circumstances, witnesses are allowed to express 
an opinion. A person who by education, study or experience has 
become an expert in any art, science or profession, may give an 
opinion and the reason for it. A layperson (a non-expert) is also 
allowed to express an opinion if it is based on personal observations 
and it is helpful to understanding such person's testimony or other 
aspects of the case. You are not bound to believe anyone's opinion. 
Consider it as you would any other evidence, and give it the weight 
you think it deserves. 
9. WHAT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OR USED AS 
EVIDENCE? 
I've explained to you what evidence is. Now I'll tell you about 
some things which do not qualify as evidence or which, for some 
other good reason, you should not consider in reaching your verdict. 
Complaint. The fact that a formal complaint has been filed 
asserting a claim against the Defendant is not evidence of 
liability. The Defendant has filed an Answer, denying any 
liability. As I will discuss in more detail later in these 
instructions, it is the Plaintiffs burden to prove to you that the 
Defendant is liable by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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Lawyer Statements. What the lawyers say is not evidence. 
Their purpose is to give you a preview of expected evidence 
and to help you understand the evidence from their viewpoint. 
If a lawyer makes a statement about the evidence which is 
different from your own recollection of the evidence, you 
should rely on your own memory. The same is true for 
statements made by a party acting as his own lawyer. Only his 
testimony while in the witness box may be considered as 
evidence. 
Personal Investigation. Evidence is not what you can find out 
on your own. You should not make any investigation about the 
facts in this case. Do not make personal inspections, 
observations or experiments. Do not view premises, things or 
articles not produced in court. Don't let anyone else do 
anything like this for you. Don't look for information in law 
books, dictionaries or public or private records which are not 
produced in court. 
Out of Court Information. Do not consider anything you may 
have heard or read about this case in the media or by word of 
mouth or other out-of-court communication. You must rely 
solely on the evidence that is produced and received in court. 
10. THE JUDGE DECIDES WHAT EVIDENCE IS 
ADMISSIBLE 
Sometimes a question will be raised about whether certain 
evidence is proper for the jury to consider. This type of question is 
called an OBJECTION. I rule on objections. If an objection is 
SUSTAINED the evidence is kept out and you should not consider 
it, nor should you guess as to what the evidence might have been or 
what was the reason for the objection. If an objection is 
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OVERRULED the evidence comes in and you may consider it. If 
evidence which you have heard or seen is STRICKEN you must 
ignore it. 
My decisions regarding the admission of evidence involve 
issues of law, and I am not giving any opinion as to which witnesses 
are or are not worthy of belief or as to which party should prevail in 
the case. Don't be concerned about the reasons for my rulings, and 
don't try to infer anything about the case from those rulings. 
Further, if I do or say anything during the course of this trial 
that suggests to you that I favor the position of either party, whether 
in my rulings or otherwise, it is entirely unintentional; and you must 
not be influenced by that in any way. 
11. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY? 
The Plaintiff has the burden of proof. The Plaintiff is the one 
making the initial claim in this case. The Plaintiff must establish 
Plaintiffs claim by a preponderance of the evidence or the greater 
weight of evidence. 
The Defendant bears the burden of proof for any defense 
offered. 
12. WHAT IS MEANT BY "PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE?" 
To be successful, Plaintiff must prove certain facts to you 
by a preponderance of the evidence. "Preponderance of 
the evidence" means the greater weight of the evidence; 
or, that evidence which is more convincing as to its truth. 
As is sometimes stated, "preponderance of the evidence" 
means such degree of proof that the greater probability of 
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truth lies therein. 
The preponderance of the evidence is not necessarily 
determined by the number of witnesses, or the number of 
documents, or the amount of testimony, but rather by the 
convincing character of the evidence, weighed 
impartially, fairly, and honestly by you. If the evidence is 
evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any 
allegation, you must find that such allegation has not 
been proved. 
13. Circumstantial Evidence. 
A fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
Circumstantial evidence consists of facts or circumstances that give 
rise to a reasonable inference of the truth of the facts sought to be 
proved. 
14. All Parties Are Equal Before the Law. 
The fact that the plaintiff is an individual and that the 
Defendant is a corporation should make no difference whatever to 
you. It is your duty to hear and determine this case the same as if it 
were between two individuals. 
15. HOW TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE 
It will be your duty to determine your verdict relying solely on 
the evidence presented during the trial. For that purpose you should 
consider all of the evidence together, fairly, impartially and 
conscientiously, putting aside any bias, prejudice, or 
preconceptions. 
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Once evidence is admitted, you must decide three things about 
it: Whether it should be believed, how important it is, and what you 
can reasonably infer or conclude from it. An inference is a 
conclusion that logic, reason, or common sense leads you to draw 
from a fact or group of facts that the evidence has established. 
Use your common sense as a reasonable person in making 
these decisions. Review all the evidence. Don't imagine things 
which have no evidence to back them up. Consider the evidence 
fairly without any bias or sympathy toward either side. 
Where there is conflicting evidence, you should try to 
reconcile the conflict so far as you reasonably can. Where the 
conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final judges and must 
determine from the evidence what the facts are. 
16. DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE A WITNESS 
You are the sole judges of the importance of the evidence, the 
believability of the witnesses and the facts. There is no firm rule 
that I can give you for determining whether a witness is truthful. As 
each witness testifies, you must decide how accurate that testimony 
is and what weight to give it, using your own good judgment and 
experience in life. In evaluating testimony, it may help you to ask 
yourself questions such as these, giving the weight you feel is 
reasonable for each issue: 
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Personal Interest. Does the witness have a personal interest in 
how the trial comes out? 
Other Bias. Does the witness have some other bias or motive 
to testify a certain way? 
Demeanor. What impression is made by the witness's 
appearance and conduct while answering questions? 
Consistency. Did the witness make conflicting statements or 
contradict other evidence? 
Knowledge and Memory. Did the witness have a good 
opportunity to know the facts and the ability to remember 
them? 
Reasonableness. Is the testimony reasonable in light of human 
experience? 
You may also apply any other common sense yardstick to the 
testimony you hear and the other evidence you receive. You are not 
required to believe any witness or all that a witness says. You are 
entitled to believe one witness as against many or many as against 
one, in accordance with your honest convictions. 
The mere fact that a witness is a police officer, in itself, does 
not make that person's testimony more or less credible, but such 




17. WHAT IF A WITNESS PURPOSELY GIVES FALSE 
TESTIMONY? 
If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony 
about anything relevant to the case, you may disregard not only the 
false testimony but any of the remaining testimony from that 
witness, or you may give the remaining testimony whatever weight 
you think it deserves. 
18. WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM 
You may take the following things with you when you go into 
the jury room to discuss this case: 
a. All exhibits admitted in evidence; 
b. Your notes (if any); 
c. Your copy of these instructions; and 
d The verdict form or forms that will be given to you. 
19. WHAT TO DO IN THE JURY ROOM 
The first thing you should do in the jury room is choose a 
person to be in charge. This person is called the FOREPERSON. 
The Foreperson's duties are: 
a. To keep order and allow everyone a chance to speak; 
b« To represent the jury in any communications you make; 
and 
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c. To sign your verdict and bring it back to court. 
In deciding what the verdict should be, all jurors are equal. 
The Foreperson has no more power than any other juror. 
20. YOUR VERDICT MUST BE YOUR OWN DECISION 
ARRIVED AT AFTER OPEN AND HONEST 
DELIBERATION. 
Consider each other's opinions, then reach your own decision 
based upon honest deliberation. It is rarely productive or good for a 
juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression 
of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain 
verdict. When that is done at the outset, a person's sense of pride 
may block appropriate consideration of the case. Use your common 
memory, your common understanding and your common sense. 
Talk about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate. 
In the end, your verdict must be your own. Don't make a 
decision just to agree with everyone else. You should, however, 
respect and consider the opinions of the other jurors. If you are 
persuaded that a decision you initially made was wrong, don't 
hesitate to change your mind. Help each other arrive at the truth. 
Your decision need not be unanimous. Only six of you need to 
agree upon the verdict. In an attempt to reach a decision, you may 




21. WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS DURING 
DELIBERATION 
If you think you need more information or a clarification, write 
a note and give it to the bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. 
We will answer your question whenever appropriate. However, 
these instructions should contain all the information you need to 
reach a verdict based upon the evidence that has been presented to 
you. You should understand that no further evidence can be 
provided to you. 
22. FOCUS ON THIS CASE ALONE 
Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You 
should not use this case as a forum for correcting perceived wrongs 
in other cases or in the broader society, or as a means of expressing 
views about anything other than the-guilt or innocence of this -sM4**- "* 
^ifijiiiidiiU Your verdict should reflect the law given to you in these^**" 
instructions applied to the facts that you find to be supported by the 
evidence. Your decision should not be distorted by any outside 
factors or objectives. 
The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict 
you return. You will make an important contribution to justice and 
your community if you focus exclusively on this case and return a 
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23. REACHING A VERDICT 
In determining any fact in this case you should not consider 
nor be influenced by any statement made or act done by the Court 
which you may interpret as indicating its views thereon. You are 
the sole and final judges of all questions of fact submitted to you, 
and you must determine such questions for yourselves from the 
evidence, without regard to what you believe the Court thinks 
thereon. The Court has not intended to express, or intimate, or be 
understood as giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does 
not show, or what are or what are not the facts in the case. Indeed, 
it is immaterial what the Court thinks about it. You must follow 
your own views and not be influenced by the views of the Court. 
As I have said, this being a civil case, your verdict must 
represent the view of three-fourths, or six members of the jury. 
When six of you are in agreement, then you have reached a verdict 
and your work is finished. At least six of you must agree on each 
issue presented to you. If there is more than one issue, the six in 
agreement need not be the same six on each issue. 
24. HOW TO REPORT YOUR VERDICT 
When you retire to deliberate, you will be provided with a 
Verdict Form, which is self-explanatory. After your deliberations 
have been completed and you have reached a verdict, the 
Foreperson should fill out and sign the Verdict form in accordance 
with the decision of the jury. 
Once the Verdict form is completed and signed, notify the 
bailiff that you are ready to return to court. The Foreperson should 
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present the Verdict Form to the bailiff, at the direction of the judge, 
when you return to the courtroom to deliver your verdict. 
25. W H A T HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN 
REPORTED 
After you have given your verdict to the judge, the clerk will 
read the jury's verdict. After that, the judge or the clerk may ask 
each of you about the verdict to make sure you agree with it. Then 
you will be released from your jury service and you may leave at 
any time. 
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with 
anyone. Likewise, you are not required to talk about it, if you don't 
want to. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the case when you 
don't want to do that, please tell the Bailiff or the Court Clerk. 
Finally, if you do decide to discuss the case with anyone, keep in 
mind that your fellow jurors freely stated their opinions in the jury 
room with the understanding that they were speaking in confidence. 
Please respect the privacy of the views of your fellow jurors. 
26. The Instructions are to be considered as a whole. 
These instructions, though numbered separately, are to be 
considered and construed by you as one connected whole: Each 
instruction should be read and understood in reference to and as a 
part of the entire charge, and not as though any one sentence or 
instruction separately were intended to state the whole law of the 
case upon any particular point. Moreover, the order in which the 
instructions are given has no significance as to their relative 
importance. 
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If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea has been 
stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none 
must be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out 
any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction, and 
ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a 
whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no 
significance as to their relative importance. 
29. What Is False Imprisonment? 
The Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
elements by a preponderance of the evidence to establish a claim of 
false imprisonment: 
a. The Defendant, or its employees or agents, acted 
intending to confine or restrain the Plaintiff; and 
b. The actions of Defendant, or its employees or agents, 
resulted in the confinement or restraint of the Plaintiff; 
and 
c. The Plaintiff was aware of the confinement or restraint, 
or was harmed by it. 
A person is restrained when that person is not free, or 
reasonably believes he is not free to leave a place to which he has 
been confined, and such person does not consent to such restraint. 
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30. Merchant's Right to Detain 
Utah has several laws which grant to a merchant the right to 
detain a person for a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner 
under certain circumstances. These laws are set forth in the Utah 
Code. 
The Defendant bears the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that such a right to detain the 
Plaintiff in this case exists, by showing: 
a. that the Defendant, and or its employee or agent, had 
reason to believe that merchandise had been wrongfully 
taken by Plaintiff, and the merchandise can be recovered 
by detaining Plaintiff in a reasonable manner for a 
reasonable length of time, for the purpose of attempting 
to effect the recovery of the merchandise or for the 
purpose of informing a peace officer of the circumstances 
of the detention; or 
b. that the Defendant, and or its employee or agent, had 
probable cause to believe that the Plaintiff had committed 
a retail theft or had taken the goods with an intent to steal 
them, if the detention is for a reasonable length of time 
for all or any of the following purposes: to recover the 
goods, or to make reasonable inquiry as to whether the 
Plaintiff has in his possession unpurchased merchandise; 
to request and/or verify identification; or 
c. to inform a peace officer of the detention of the person 
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It is a lawful defense to alleged wrongful detention if 
Defendant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
person causing the detention of the Plaintiff had probable cause to 
believe that Plaintiff had committed retail theft and that the 
Defendant and its employees and agents acted reasonably in 
detaining Plaintiff under all circumstances of this case. 
"Retail theft" is when a person knowingly takes possession of, 
conceals, carries away, transfers, or causes to be transferred, any 
merchandise displayed, held, or offered for sale in a retail store with 
the intention of retaining such merchandise or with the intention of 
depriving the merchant permanently of the possession, use or 
benefit of such merchandise without paying the retail value of such 
merchandise. 
To show "probable cause" means that the Defendant must 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant or its 
employees or agents believed in good faith that his or her actions 
were lawful and that such belief was reasonable. 
Whether such belief was "reasonable" must be determined 
under all the applicable circumstances. 
If you find that the Defendant or its employees made a 
"citizens' arrest" of the Plaintiff, then for Defendant to establish that 
its conduct was not wrongful, Defendant must also show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the person who detained 
Plaintiff informed the Plaintiff at the time of the detention of his 
intention to detain Plaintiff, the cause of the detention, and the 
person's authority to make the detention. Such notice shall not be 
required, however, when there is reason to believe that the notice 
will endanger the life or safety of the person making the citizens' 
arrest, or will likely enable the Plaintiff to escape; or at the time of 
the detention the Plaintiff was actually engaged in the commission 
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of, or attempted commission of, a crime; or, the Plaintiff is being 
detained as a part of his pursuit immediately after the commission of 
a crime. 
31. The Verdict Form. 
Upon the jury's reaching a verdict, the foreperson shall 
complete and sign the verdict form. That form states: 
At least six of the eight members of the jury find as follows on 
each point: 
1. Plaintiff was detained by Defendant or its employees or 








3, Defendant, or its employees or agents, had the lawful 
right to detain the Plaintiff because: 
a. The Defendant, and or its employee or agent, had 
reason to believe that merchandise had been 
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wrongfully taken by the Plaintiff, and the 
merchandise can be recovered by detaining the 
Plaintiff in a reasonable manner for a reasonable 
length of time, for the purpose of attempting to 
effect the recovery of the merchandise or for the 
purpose of informing a peace officer of the 
circumstances of the detention. 
Yes _><_ 
No 
b. The Defendant, and or its employee or agent, had 
probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had 
committed a retail theft or had taken the goods with 
an intent to steal them, if the detention is for a 
reasonable length of time for all or any of the 
following purposes: to recover the goods, or to make 
reasonable inquiry as to whether Plaintiff has in his 
possession unpurchased merchandise; to request 
and/or verify identification. 
Yes 
No X 
to inform a peace officer of the detention of the 
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3. Did Defendant show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the person causing the detention of the Plaintiff had 
probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had committed 
retail theft and that the Defendant and its employees and 
agents acted reasonably in detaining Plaintiff under all 
circumstances of this case. 
Yes 
No X 
4. If you find that the Defendant or its employees performed 
a "citizens' arrest", then do you also find that the 
Defendant or its employees and/or agents provided notice 
to the Plaintiff at the time of the detention of his intention 
to detain Plaintiff, the cause of the detention, and the 
person's authority to make the detention. 
Yes ^C 
No 
5. If you find that the Defendant or its employees performed 
a "citizens' arrest", and if your answer to No. 4 is "no", 
was there reason to believe that the notice will endanger 
the life or safety of the person making the arrest, or will 
likely enable the Plaintiff to escape; or at the time of the 
detention the Plaintiff was actually engaged in the 
commission of, or attempted commission of, a crime; or, 
the Plaintiff is being detained as a part of his pursuit 
immediately after the commission of a crime? 
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Yes 
No 
6. If you find that Plaintiff was detained, please state the 
dollar amount of damage, if any, Plaintiff proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he suffered as a direct 
and proximate consequence of the detention. 
$ 5 (flpp 
Instruction No. 32 
In determining questions of fact, you are not at liberty to 
indulge in speculation or conjecture, nor are you at liberty to follow 
your own ideas of what the law is or should be. On the contrary, 
you are required to look solely to the evidence for the facts and to 
the instructions given you by the court for the law, and to return a 
verdict which in all respects, including without limitation the 
amount of damages (if any), is in accordance with the foregoing. 
Instruction No. 33 
If a party has access to evidence but fails to present such 
evidence at trial, the jury may draw such adverse inferences against 
such party as it deems appropriate based upon that party's failure to 
present such evidence. 
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Page 31 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN A. JENKINS, I., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATIONAL PRODUCT SALES, 
INC., 
Defendant. 
... _ _ -*•>» *i« 1*11,1 c « f | T 
Tnlrd Judicial District 
AUG 12 2005 
VERDICT MLTU^OONTY 
Case No. 010911737 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
We, at least six of the Jurors in the above case, find as follows: 
1. Plaintiff was detained by Defendant or its employees or agents who acted 
intentionally and without Plaintiffs consent. 
Yes X 
No 
2. Plaintiff was aware of the detention or was damaged by the detention. 
Yes )( 
No 
Defendant, or its employees or agents, had the lawful right to detain the Plaintiff 
because: 
a. The Defendant, and or its employee or agent, had reason to believe that 
merchandise had been wrongfully taken by the Plaintiff, and the 
merchandise can be recovered by detaining the Plaintiff in a reasonable 
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manner for a reasonable length of time, for the purpose of attempting to 
effect the recovery of the merchandise or for the purpose of informing a 
peace officer of the circumstances of the detention. 
X 
b. The Defendant, and or its employee or agent, had probable cause to 
believe that Plaintiff had committed a retail theft or had taken the goods 
with an intent to steal them, if the detention is for a reasonable length of 
time for all or any of the following purposes: to recover the goods, or to 
make reasonable inquiry as to whether Plaintiff has in his possession 
unpurchased merchandise; to request and/or verify identification. 
Yes 
No * 
to inform a peace officer of the detention of the person and surrender that 
person to the custody of a peace officer. 
No _ £ . 
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Did Defendant show by a preponderance of the evidence that the person causing 
the detention of the Plaintiff had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had 
committed retail theft and that the Defendant and its employees and agents acted 
reasonably in detaining Plaintiff under all circumstances of this case. 
Yes 
No X 
If you find that the Defendant or its employees performed a "citizens' arrest", then 
do you also find that the Defendant or its employees and/or agents provided notice 
to the Plaintiff at the time of the detention of his intention to detain Plaintiff, the 
cause of the detention, and the person's authority to make the detention. 
Yes X 
No 
If you find that the Defendant or its employees performed a "citizens' arrest", and 
if your answer to No. 4 is "no", was there reason to believe that the notice will 
endanger the life or safety of the person making the arrest, or will likely enable the 
Plaintiff to escape; or at the time of the detention the Plaintiff was actually 
engaged in the commission of, or attempted commission of, a crime; or, the 
Plaintiff is being detained as a part of his pursuit immediately after the 
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If you find tnat Plaintiff was detained, please state the dollar amount of damage, if 
any, Plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered as a 
direct and proximate consequence of the detention. 
$ 5fi(K> 
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Third Judfciai District 
TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
ANDREW M. WADSWORTH, #9517 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Attorneys for Defendant National Product Sales 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
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ENTERED IN REGISTRY. 
OF.JUDGMENTS ^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN A. JENKINS, I, 
Plaintiff, 




Civil No. 010911737 
Judge: John Paul Kennedy 
This action came on for trial on August 12, 2005, before the court and a jury, the 
Honorable Judge John Paul Kennedy, District Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly 
tried'and the jury having duly rendered its verdict, 
It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff take nothing, that the action be dimsissed 




DATED this QOj_ day of Syf.:I 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
lX\ hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
\ I day of fiiFf g_, 2005 to the following: 
Lynn A. Jenkins 
3 East 2750 South 





Philip R. Hughes (4224) 
6843 South 3420 West 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Telephone: (801) 637-3900 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN A. JENKINS, I, 
Plaintiff, 
vs* 
NATIONAL PRODUCT SALES, INC* 
dba NPS, and JOHN DOES I-X 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff, LYNN A. JENKINS, I., alleges as follows: 
1. That he is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. 
2• That the acts and events which are the subject of this 
cause of action occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah* 
3, Defendant corporation has its principal place of 
business and offices in Salt Lake County, state of Utah. 
4- The damages caused by defendant, exceed $1,000.00, as 
alleged herein. 
First Cause of Action 
Wrongful Arrest by Private Person 
5. Defendant NPS is in the business of retail sales, 
however it differs from normal retail sales establishments in 
several aspects: 
a. A large majority of the defendants goods are 
damaged in packaging or otherwise, and .ADDENDUM 
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arbitrarily; 
b. The goods sold by defendant are sold without 
warranty, except as may be provided by statute, and goods 
sold are without manufacturer warranty except as may be 
provided by statute; 
c. The goods sold by defendant are not returnable 
after purchase, under any circumstances; 
d. Certain managers of NPS have authority to negotiate 
prices different than as marked and frequently discount 
marked prices; 
e. The store has a policy of allowing customers to 
remove items from the store in order to allow them to check 
for fit, as once purchased, the item cannot be returned, 
6. For several years prior to the incident which gives rise 
to this cause of action, Plaintiff had been a valued customer of 
Defendant, having spent thousands of dollars in the years 1999 
and 2000, and frequently purchased items at Defendant's weekly 
auction, as well as at other times* 
7. The Plaintiff, was well known to several of the 
employees of Defendant, due to the frequency of his visits to the 
store, and viewed as a valued and trusted customer of Defendant's 
employees * 
8. On or about February 9, 2001, Plaintiff entered the 
business of Defendant, to find a bumper for a vehicle. He found 
a bumper which he thought might fit his vehicl^f^*^fc^f^p»ft3i a 
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clerk at the exit that he needed to check to see if it would fit 
his vehicle. 
9. As is customary, the clerk asked the Plaintiff to leave 
a form of picture identification prior to leaving the business. 
10. The Plaintiff had such a Utah identification card with 
him, and gave it to the clerk, who accepted the identification as 
reasonable security for removing the bumper from the business 
premises. 
11. The Plaintiff returned shortly thereafter to the sales 
area, and asked to speak with a manager, to negotiate the price 
of the bumper. 
12* Plaintiff was informed that the person who could 
negotiate a price other than as marked was not there at that 
time, but would return within an hour or so. 
13. The Plaintiff informed the clerk, who had maintained 
the possession of his identification, that he had to go to 
Bountiful, and would return• 
14. The clerk took no action to instruct the Plaintiff to 
return the bumper to the building, nor did the clerk inform 
Plaintiff that he was not allowed to remove the bumper from the 
parking lot. 
15. Approximately one hour later, Plaintiff returned* He 
carried the bumper into the store, returned it to the shelf where 
he had originally found it. 
16. At the time the bumper was ^©turnec^ |^>«vm^M|ri<rfadf ied 
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the clerk that he was returning the bumper. Plaintiff also 
requested the return of his identification at that time. 
17. When the bumper was returned, an agent of Defendant, 
who was acting as store security saw the Plaintiff return the 
bumper, and followed Plaintiff to watch him return the bumper to 
its original aisle and appropriate location. 
18. The security guard also inspected the bumper, then 
followed the Plaintiff* 
19. As Plaintiff was proceeding to the clerk to get his 
identification card, he was stopped by the security guard, who 
told him to go into the interrogation office. 
20* Plaintiff informed the security guard that he was going 
to get his identification card and leave the store. 
21. At this point, the security guard began pushing the 
Plaintiff, 8 times, in his chest with an open palm, saying, "No, 
you're coming with me." 
22. He then took the Plaintiff to the interrogation room, 
then took Plaintiff's left arm, then his right arm, and hand 
cuffed the Plaintiff. 
23. The security guard refused to allow Plaintiff to leave 
thei interrogation room. 
24. The security guard, acting within the scope of his 
employ, initiated a "taping" of the interrogation by using a 
video recorder. 
25. The security guard also called the P f H f S C M n i IM 
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26. The police arrived shortly thereafter, and after 
hearing both parties, informed the security officer that this was 
a civil matter, not a criminal matter, because there was no clear 
policy against removal of items from the premises. 
27. Pursuant to §77-7-1, et. seq., a private individual is 
entitled to make an arrest only if a crime has occurred. 
28. In this instance, Mr, Jenkins had permission to remove 
the bumper from the premises, had left an identification as 
requested, and returned the bumper to it's original location. 
29. Defendant's agent, acting on behalf of Defendant, 
arrested the Plaintiff• 
30. Plaintiff has been damaged thereby in an amount of not 
less than $250,000,00, or such other and further amounts as may 
be proven at trial. 
31. Plaintiff has been forced to retain the services of an 
attorney, and is entitled to compensation for such costs. 
Second Cause of Action 
Joint and Several Liability 
32. At the time of the wrongful arrest, the Defendant was 
not an authorized corporation by the state of Utah, therefore, 
officers and directors of the fraudulent corporation may be 
individually liable. 
33. John Does I-V are unidentified officers and directors 
and or agents of Defendant NPS. 
34. John Does Vl-X are unidentified employees of Defendant 




35. John Does X-XV are unidentified property owners of 
Defendant's premises, who may have culpability because of the 
wrongful arrest of Plaintiff* 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court enter its 
judgment as follows: 
1. For an Order that Defendant, and its employees are 
jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff in the amount of not 
less than $250,000.00, or such other and further amounts as may 
be proven at trial. 
2. For an Order that Defendant, and its officers and 
directors are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff in the 
amount of not less than $250,000,00, or such other and further 
amounts as may be proven at trial. 
3. For an Order that Defendant, and the owners of the 
premises used and occupied by Defendant be jointly and severally 
liable to Plaintiff in the amount of not less than $250,000.00, 
or such other and further amounts as may be proven at trial. 
4. For costs and attorneys fees, as may be just and 
reasonable. 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem 
justi and proper. 




STATE OF UTAH 
County of Davis 
ss, 
) 
LYNN A. JENKINS, I., being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and states that he is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled 
action, that he has read the foregoing Verified Petition, and 
understands the contents thereof, and the same is true to the 
best of his own knowledge• 
DATED t h 
ww* a. n i l U H X t j U 
"day of December, 2001. 
LYtfrTh. JENKINS, I 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2JJ 
2001. " ^ 
V day o f December, 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBL 
State of Utah 
ROOKEYJHWWLTON 
Notify Pubfie 
« ^ Wcomm. Expires S a p S f t W * | 





The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and 
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of 
their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for 
the abuse of that right. 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is substantial evidence to 
support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on bail 
awaiting trial on a previous felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to support 
the new felony charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated by statute as one for which bail 
may be denied, if there is substantial evidence to support the charge and the court finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that the person would constitute a substantial danger to 
any other person or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court if 
released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal only as prescribed by 
law. 
Article I, Section 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
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prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Where the person is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of 
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination 
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the 
appellee if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Article I, Section 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by 
information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination 
be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or without 
such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 
Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Article I, Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Article I, Section 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express 
words they are declared to be otherwise. 
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Article I, Section 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual 
rights and the perpetuity of free government. 
STATUTES 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district 
courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone 
and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil 
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after 
January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting 
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United 
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of 
the place where the act or omission occurred. 
28 U.S.C. § 2674 Liability of United States The United States shall be liable, respecting 
the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same 
extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest 
prior to judgment or for punitive damages. If, however, in any case wherein death was 
caused, the law of the place where the act or omission complained of occurred provides, 
or has been construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the United States 
shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries 
resulting from such death to the persons respectively, for whose benefit the action was 
brought, in lieu thereof. With respect to any claim under this chapter, the United States 
sha,ll \>Q (entitled to assert any defense based upon judicial or legislative immunity which 
otherwise would have been available to the employee of the United States whose act or 
omission gave rise to the claim, as well as any other defenses to which the United States 
is entitled. With respect to any claim to which this section applies, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority shall be entitled to assert any defense which otherwise would have been 
available to the employee based upon judicial or legislative immunity, which otherwise 
would have been available to the employee of the Tennessee Valley Authority whose act 
or omission gave rise to the claim as well as any other defenses to which the Tennessee 
Valley Authority is entitled under this chapter. 
28 U.S.C. § 2680 Exceptions The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this 
title shall not apply to— (a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of 
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether 
or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal 
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be 
abused, (b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of 
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tetters or postal matter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602, Retail theft, acts constituting. 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers or causes to be carried away or 
transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining such merchandise or with the 
intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the possession, use or benefit of such 
merchandise without paying the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price tag, marking, indicia of value or any 
other markings which aid in determining value of any merchandise displayed, held, 
stored or offered for sale, in a retail mercantile establishment and attempts to purchase 
such merchandise personally or in consort with another at less than the retail value with 
the intention of depriving the merchant of the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment from the container in or on which such merchandise is 
displayed to any other container with the intention of depriving the merchant of the retail 
value of such merchandise; or 
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of the retail value of the 
merchandise; or 
(5) Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a retail mercantile establishment with 
the intent of depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-603. Detention of suspected violator by merchant — Purposes. 
Any merchant who has probable cause to believe that a person has committed retail theft 
may detain such person, on or off the premises of a retail mercantile establishment, in a 
reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time for all or any of the following 
purposes: 
(1) To make reasonable inquiry as to whether such person has in his possession 
unpurchased merchandise and to make reasonable investigation of the ownership of such 
merchandise; 
(2) To request identification; 
(3) To verify such identification; 
(4) To make a reasonable request of such person to place or keep in full view any 
merchandise such individual may have removed, or which the merchant has reason to 
believe he may have removed, from its place of display or elsewhere, whether for 
examination, purchase or for any other reasonable purpose; 
(5) To inform a peace officer of the detention of the person and surrender that person to 
the custody of a peace officer; 
(6) In the case of a minor, to inform a peace officer, the parents, guardian or other private 
person interested in the welfare of that minor immediately, if possible, of this detention 
and to surrender custody of such minor to such person. 
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A merchant may make a detention as permitted herein off the premises of a retail 
mercantile establishment only if such detention is pursuant to an immediate pursuit of 
such person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-604. Defense to action bv person detained. 
In any action for false arrest, false imprisonment, unlawful detention, defamation of 
character, assault, trespass, or invasion of civil rights brought by any person detained by 
the merchant, it shall be a defense to such action that the merchant detaining such person 
had probable cause to believe that the person had committed retail theft and that the 
merchant acted reasonably under all circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-3. By private persons. 
A private person may arrest another: 
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence; or 
(2) When a felony has been committed and he has reasonable cause to believe the person 
arrested has committed it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-6. Manner of making arrest. 
(1) The person making the arrest shall inform the person being arrested of his intention, 
cause, and authority to arrest him. Such notice shall not be required when: 
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will endanger the life or safety of the officer or 
another person or will likely enable the party being arrested to escape; 
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to 
commit, an offense; or 
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately after the commission of an offense 
or an escape. 
(2)3(a) If a hearing-impaired person, as defined in Subsection 78-24a-l(2), is arrested for 
an alleged violation of a criminal law, including a local ordinance, the arresting officer 
shall assess the communicative abilities of the hearing-impaired person and conduct this 
notification, and any further notifications of rights, warnings, interrogations, or taking of 
statements, in a manner that accurately and effectively communicates with the hearing-
ii^pa^cf person including qualified interpreters, lip reading, pen and paper, typewriters, 
computers with print-out capability, and telecommunications devices for the deaf. 
(b)jCspmpliance with this subsection is a factor to be considered by any court when 
ev^luatipg whether statements of a hearing-impaired person were made knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-12. Detaining persons suspected of shoplifting or library theft -
Pepqns authorized 
(1) A pepe officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, servant, or agent who has 
r^§o^b l^ grounds to believe that goods held or displayed for sale by the merchant have 
been taken by a person with intent to steal may, for the purpose of investigating the 
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unlawful act and attempting to effect a recovery of the goods, detain the person in a 
reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time. 
(2) A peace officer or employee of a library may detain a person for the purposes and 
under the limits of Subsection (1) if there are reasonable grounds to believe the person 
violated Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 8, Library Theft. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-14. Person causing detention or arrest of person suspected of 
shoplifting or library theft — Civil and criminal immunity. 
(1) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, servant, or agent who causes the 
detention of a person as provided in Section 77-7-12, or who causes the arrest of a person 
for theft of goods held or displayed for sale, is not criminally or civilly liable where he 
has reasonable and probable cause to believe the person detained or arrested committed a 
theft of goods held or displayed for sale. 
(2) A peace officer or employee of a library who causes a detention or arrest of a person 
under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 8, Library Theft, is not criminally or civilly liable where 
he has reasonable and probable cause to believe that the person committed a theft of 
library materials. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over 
which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record 
involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: . . . 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-18. Merchant's authority to detain. 
Any merchant who has reason to believe that merchandise has been wrongfully taken by 
an individual contrary to Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 and that he can recover such 
merchandise by taking such individual into custody and detaining him may, for the 
purpose of attempting to effect such recovery or for the purpose of informing a peace 
officer of the circumstances of such detention, take the individual into custody and detain 
him in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time. Such taking into custody 
and detention by a merchant or his employee shall not render such merchant or his 
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pmployee criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false imprisonment, slander or 
unlawful detention or for any other type of claim or action unless the custody and 
detention are unreasonable under all the circumstances. 
RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict.. . . (b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied 
or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the 
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Not later 
than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may 
move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have 
judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was 
not returned such party, within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for 
judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial 
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If a 
verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the 
judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested 
verdict had been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may direct the entry of 
judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed or may order a new trial. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52. Findings by the court . . . . (b) Amendment. 
Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may 
amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. 
When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised 
whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a 
motion for a new trial. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59. New trials: amendments of judgment, (a) 
Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of 
the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, 
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may 
open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of 
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of 
a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the 
court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been 
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induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question 
submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of 
bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after 
the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under 
Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion 
for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The 
opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. 
The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be 
extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good 
cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply 
affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its 
own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new 
trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall 
be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
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